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501 
ARTICLE 
The Safe Drinking Water / Food Law Nexus 
 
MARGOT J. POLLANS* 
 
At 2 AM on August 2, 2014, the Ohio Environmental 
Protection Agency issued the following warning to the citizens of 
Toledo: “Do Not Drink.”1  The Ohio City’s tap water was 
contaminated with microcystin, a toxin that can cause diarrhea, 
vomiting, and abnormal liver function.2  The source was an algal 
bloom in Lake Erie resulting from high levels of agricultural 
fertilizers and animal waste.3  For three days, Toledo residents 
drank only bottled water. 
This is just one of many similar examples of agricultural 
contamination of urban drinking water supplies. Creating a 
physical connection between urban and rural communities, this 
pollution highlights the need for an environmentally-minded and 
systems-based food and agriculture law. 
Despite over forty years of extensive federal regulation of 
water pollution, agricultural waste, most of which enters drinking 
water as “nonpoint source pollution,” remains a significant threat 
to safe drinking water as well as aquatic ecosystems. Climate 
 
* Teaching Fellow. UCLA School of Law, Resnick Program for Food Law and 
Policy, 2013-15. Assistant Professor of Law, Pace Law School, 2015- . Thanks to 
Jason Czarnezki and Ann Carlson for their helpful comments. 
 1. Codi Kozacek, Seven Ohio Drinking Water Sources Don’t Meet State Water 
Quality Standards for Toxic Algae, CIRCLE OF BLUE (Aug. 25, 2014, 4:58 PM), 
http://www.circleofblue.org/waternews/2014/world/seven-ohio-drinking-water-
sources-dont-meet-state-water-quality-standards-toxic-algae/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/8DBW-T6DR. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
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change threatens to exacerbate this threat.4  Furthermore, the 
Clean Water Act’s failure to address these harms is well 
documented.5  The Act provides no federally enforceable 
mechanism for mitigating nonpoint source pollution. Many have 
proposed solutions including radical amendments of the statute 
itself, aggressive state action to fill the gap, and expansion of the 
United States Department of Agriculture’s conservation programs 
which pay farmers to change their practices to reduce water 
contamination.6 
As a component of food law, the Clean Water Act’s failure to 
address agricultural water pollution must be understood as a 
back drop to a companion federal statute: the Safe Drinking 
Water Act (SDWA).7  The SDWA requires the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) to set drinking water standards for 
harmful contaminants, and it requires that public water utilities 
meet those standards either through water filtration and 
treatment, or through source water protection.8 
The SDWA is widely attacked, particularly by local 
government officials, as an unfunded mandate imposing 
 
 4. Robert W. Adler, Agriculture and Water Quality: A Climate-Integrated 
Perspective, 37 VT. L. REV. 847, 875 (2013) (describing how climate change might 
affect existing water quality problems). 
 5. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and 
Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 298-304 (2000). 
 6. See id.; Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25 
ENVTL. L. 973 (1995); Terence J. Centner, Nutrient Pollution from Land 
Applications of Manure: Discerning a Remedy for Pollution, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 213 (2010); John R. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism: The Advent of Local 
Environmental Law, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 413-16 (2002); J.B. Ruhl & 
James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the 
Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59 (2010); 
David Zaring, Note, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution, and Regulatory 
Control: The Clean Water Act’s Bleak Present and Future, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 515, 524-25 (1996). 
 7. Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (2012). 
 8. Id. § 300g-1 (mandating that the EPA set national drinking water 
standards); id. § 300g-2 (delegating primary enforcement authority to the 
states). Public water utilities are utilities that provide water to at least twenty-
five people or have at least fifteen service connections. Id. § 300f(4). The 
statutory requirements thus do not apply to wells or to very small drinking 
water systems. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss2/8
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excessive, and often unjustified, costs on local governments.9  
Critics argue that its uniform and risk-averse requirements 
reflect the need to devolve authority to states to engage in more 
location-specific standard setting. Proponents argue that the cost 
and complexity of risk assessment combined with the need to 
provide uniformly clean water to all, justify federal 
intervention.10 
This debate, which focuses on the SDWA in isolation from the 
Clean Water Act, misses a central flaw in the structure of the 
SDWA. As implemented by the EPA and the states, the SDWA 
assigns primary responsibility for provision of clean water to 
municipal and regional water utilities that often have little or no 
control over drinking water sources. 
Where point source pollution is the primary threat to safe 
water, this allocation is reasonable. Water utilities are simply 
providing a backstop to ensure that water, whose content is often 
already heavily policed under the Clean Water Act, is safe to 
drink. 
By contrast, where the primary threat to safe drinking water 
is nonpoint source pollution, water utilities provide what is often 
the first line of defense. Of the nearly ninety pollutants for which 
the EPA sets SDWA standards, at least twenty-four enter 
 
 9. Scott D. Laufenberg, The Struggle of Cities to Implement the Safe 
Drinking Water Act in the Context of Intergovernmental Relations, 3 DRAKE J. 
AGRIC. L. 495, 499 (1998) (observing that the SDWA can be extremely 
burdensome for municipalities adjacent to agricultural communities); David L. 
Markell, The Role of Local Governments in Environmental Regulation: Shoring 
Up Our Federal System, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 895, 898-90 (1993) (describing 
concern that the SDWA fails to prioritize among various risks); Jeffrey Marks, 
The Role of Federal Environmental Mandates in Intergovernmental Relations, 20 
ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 17, 23 (1996) (observing that many local officials 
have called for increased local flexibility in standard setting and explaining that 
tension arises when federal financial support does not keep up with rising 
compliance costs); Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental Mandates and the 
“New (New) Federalism”: Devolution, Revolution, or Reform?, 81 MINN. L. REV. 
97, 202 (1996) (arguing that the SDWA regulations do not allow adequate 
tailoring to local conditions or adequate assessment of compliance feasibility). 
 10. See, e.g., Steinzor, supra note 9, at 140, 171-73 (noting that cities and 
counties identify the SDWA as one of the most expensive federal mandates but 
expressing concern that “unrestricted devolution of fundamental regulatory 
decisions to the local level” could result in massive inequality in availability of 
safe drinking water). 
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waterways through agricultural nonpoint source pollution.11  The 
list includes pesticides, herbicides, nitrates, and microbial 
contaminants from animal waste.12  Without independent source 
controls, water utilities must engage in burdensome cleanup in 
order to meet SDWA standards.13 
Taken together, the Clean Water Act and the SDWA thus 
assign primary responsibility for nonpoint source pollution 
cleanup to water utilities. Although both statutes envision a role 
for states in establishing source control programs, neither statute 
mandates such controls, and many states have declined to 
develop robust programs.14  In the remainder of this essay, I will 
draw three conclusions about this dynamic. 
First, in the long run, particularly if predictions are correct 
that climate change will exacerbate the risk of drinking water 
contamination from agricultural pollutants, the dynamic 
described in the preceding paragraphs could serve as an 
 
 11. EPA, 816-F-09-004, NAT’L PRIMARY DRINKING WATER REGULATIONS (2009), 
available at http://water.epa.gov/drink/contaminants/upload/mcl.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/4MQQ-Q7V5. The Twenty-four pollutants are those identified by 
the EPA as entering drinking water from agricultural-related runoff. ENVTL. 
WORKING GRP., DRINKING WATER POLLUTION HAS MANY SOURCES (2009), 
available at http://www.ewg.org/tap-water/sourcesofwaterpollution.php, 
archived at http://perma.cc/KC8W-BWEJ. The Environmental Working Group 
(EWG) identifies a total of ninety-seven agricultural-related contaminants in 
drinking water. Of these, thirty-five are regulated. For those thirty-five, EWG 
found that 127 million people had been exposed to levels exceeding EPA 
guidelines.  Id. See also Ronald Munger et al., Intrauterine Growth Retardation 
in Iowa Communities with Herbicide-Contaminated Drinking Water Supplies, 
105 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 308 (1997), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm. 
nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1470002/pdf/envhper00316-0054.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/6PAR-6ETM (discussing pesticide contamination in humans). 
 12. See EPA, supra note 11. 
 13. For instance, following a cryptosporidium outbreak in 1993, the 
Milwaukee Water Works invested eighty-nine million dollars for capital 
improvements to its water filtration systems. Don Behm, Milwaukee Marks 20 
Years Since Cryptosporidium Outbreak, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 6, 2013, 
http://www.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/milwaukee-marks-20-years-since-
cryptosporidium-outbreak-099dio5-201783191.html, archived at http://perma.cc 
/HWH3-GUAM. See infra notes 16, 21-25, and accompanying text (discussing 
the potential for water utilities to engage in source control). 
 14. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 4, at 855-56 (noting that while there are some 
watershed specific success stories the overall picture is bleak). See also Clean 
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 300g-2. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss2/8
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important catalyst for change.15  As filtration and treatment costs 
rise, water utilities and the state agencies overseeing them will 
continue to seek alternative approaches, including using 
litigation to reallocate mitigation costs from municipal ratepayers 
to farmers.16  They may also put pressure on state governments 
to develop more comprehensive nonpoint source pollution 
regulatory programs. Public support for such efforts may also 
increase in response to high salience contamination events, such 
as the Toledo incident described above. In other words, this type 
of extremely costly and public pollution in urban areas creates a 
constituency for environmental protection that may not have 
existed before. 
Second, the failure to regulate nonpoint source pollution 
creates an arbitrary assignment of pollution abatement costs. The 
extent to which a water utility provides the first line of defense or 
merely end-of-line finishing cleanup depends on the nature of the 
pollution source.17  Those within the direct ambit of agricultural 
 
 15. See Adler, supra note 4, at 875 (describing the potential effects of climate 
change on drinking water). 
 16. The Clean Water Act preempts interstate nuisance suits under federal 
common law. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (holding that the Clean 
Water Act preempted interstate nuisance claims under federal common law). 
But, water utilities can still bring suit under state common law. Int’l Paper Co. 
v. Ouellete, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).  Interstate suits, by state or private parties, 
can also be brought under state law provided that they are brought under the 
law of the source state. Id. (holding that the Clean Water Act preempted the 
common law of an affected state where that state, or a citizen of that state, 
attempts to impose liability on a point source in another state). In City of Tulsa 
v. Tyson Foods, Inc., Tulsa sued various poultry processors claiming that poultry 
waste from factory farms was contaminating the drinking water supply. City of 
Tulsa v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (N.D. Okla. 2003), vacated, No. 
01-CV-0900EA(C), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23416 (N.D. Okla. July 16, 2003). The 
City of Des Moines also made a recent creative attempt to sue its neighboring 
agricultural communities under the Clean Water Act, attempting to characterize 
some agricultural pollution as a point source. Notice of Intent to Sue from 
William Stowe, Bd. of Water Works Trs. of the City of Des Moines, Iowa, to Rick 
Hecht, Chairperson of the Sac Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, Gary Nicholson, 
Chairperson of the Calhoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, Dale Arends, Chairperson 
of the Buena Vista Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors (Jan. 9, 2014) at 7, available at 
http://www.circleofblue.org/waternews/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/DMWW 
notice-of-intent-to-sue-2.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/D4EC-AUSK 
(attempting to characterize tile drainage as a point source). The Iowa notice of 
intent to sue also alleged Iowa common law nuisance and trespass claims. Id. 
 17. Of course, other factors affect the scope of cleanup necessary to meet 
SDWA standards. A utility whose source water has many point sources may face 
5
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water pollution must take on this extra cost; utilities outside that 
ambit need not. This concern is a more specific variation of the 
general concern that the statute imposes uniform standards on 
utilities facing highly variable compliance costs.18  Indeed, this is 
a standard critique of many types of uniform federal 
regulations.19 
What is different and particularly troublesome here is that 
the variation stems from underlying disparate application of the 
“polluter pays” principle. Because a large category of polluters are 
not responsible for the costs of the water pollution they cause, a 
subset of water utilities are saddled with extra costs. Ratepayers 
ultimately bear the burden of this arbitrary allocation of costs. 
Although there is some federal and state financial assistance, a 
substantial portion of increased compliance costs falls to water 
users.20 
This allocation of responsibility is often inefficient. In some 
cases, it is less costly to control the source than it is to filter or 
treat at the tap, particularly where increased contamination 
 
a larger burden than one with fewer, even if all those sources are complying 
with their Clean Water Act obligations. Likewise, a utility that relies heavily on 
groundwater, which is generally not directly policed under the Clean Water Act, 
may face similar problems. See JAMES SALZMAN, DRINKING WATER: A HISTORY 
127-31 (2013) (describing the threat of fracking). 
 18. In the context of the SDWA, proponents of less uniform regulations 
believe that the statute imposes costly obligations whether or not they are 
relevant to different regions. Some also believe that localities should have the 
leeway to opt for lower safety standards if that is their preference. 
 19. See NICOLE V. CRAIN & W. MARK CRAIN, THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY COSTS 
ON SMALL FIRMS 7 (2010); Ashlea Ebeling, The Other Federal Budget, FORBES 
(Oct. 1, 2003, 11:20 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2003/10/01/cz_ae_ 
1001beltway.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ZZ8D-YV7V; Jim Tankersley, 
Report: New Regulations Cost $216B and 87 Million Hours of Paperwork. What 
do they reap?, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/14/report-new-regulations-cost-216-billion-and-87-
million-hours-of-paperwork/, archived at http://perma.cc/D59T-S8AX. 
 20. See, e.g., Funding Sources, EPA, http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/rulesregs/ 
sdwa/arsenic/funding.cfm (last updated Mar. 6, 2012), archived at 
http://perma.cc/B7NS-XFBX. Rate increases also depend on the size of a water 
district. A 1990s EPA study on water utility financial capacity revealed that for 
large systems, compliance required increasing average annual rates by about 
three dollars per household; for smaller systems, the average increase was $145. 
Steinzor, supra note 9, at 208-09.  
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss2/8
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necessitates building entirely new treatment facilities.21  In 
theory, if a water utility determines that source protection is 
cheaper than building or renovating a treatment or filtration 
facility, it should engage in Coasian bargaining and pay for 
protection rather than build or renovate the treatment or 
filtration facility.22 Some water utilities are able to take control of 
their source water via land purchase or through green payments 
to land owners to reduce their pollution.23  New York City is one 
of the best examples of a large urban water system that has 
successfully protected its source waters and does not filter its 
water.24  But for many municipalities and water utilities the 
transaction costs to take control of source water are simply too 
high. These transaction costs may include, among others, 
difficulty identifying sources, lack of political will at the state 
level to develop nonpoint source pollution controls, lack of will 
 
 21. See, e.g., Mark D. Hoffer, The New York City Watershed Memorandum of 
Agreement: Forging a Partnership to Protect Water Quality, 18 U. BALTIMORE J. 
ENVTL. L. 17 (2010); Stephanie Perez, Note and Comment, New York City’s 
Drinking Water—Champagne or Beer?, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 859 (1995). 
 22. See generally James M. Buchanan, The Coase Theorem and the Theory of 
the State, 13 NAT. RESOURCES J. 579 (1973). 
 23. The 1996 Amendments to the SDWA acknowledged the importance of 
source water protection and created a mechanism for water utilities to engage in 
source control as an alternative to filtration and treatment. Safe Drinking 
Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182 (1996) (codified as 
amended in throughout title 42 of the U.S. Code). Filtration avoidance is 
available where the utility demonstrates adequate ownership or control over the 
source watershed: “[t]he public water system must demonstrate through 
ownership and/or written agreements with landowners within the watershed 
that it can control all human activities which may have an adverse impact on 
the microbiological quality of the source water.” 40 C.F.R. § 141.71(b)(iv)(2)(iii) 
(2015). Filtration avoidance is also a possibility where a utility relies on water 
from “uninhabited, undeveloped watersheds in consolidated ownership, and 
having control over access to, and activities in, those watersheds.” 42 U.S.C. § 
300g-1(b)(7)(C)(v) (2012). 
 24. See, e.g., About Watershed Protection, NYC ENVTL. PROT.,  
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dep/html/watershed_protection/about.shtml (last 
visited Feb, 27, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/ZQ5X-BMTR; New York City 
Water Supply, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, http://www.dec.ny.gov 
/lands/25599.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/ZM3P-
M7M6. 
7
8_POLLANS FINAL 10/1/2015  10:43 AM 
508 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  32 
 
among polluters to engage in negotiation, or lack of expertise at 
the public water utility about source control options.25 
The ancillary benefits of prevention at the source—beyond 
safer drinking water—also sway this cost benefit analysis. 
Prevention at the source protects aquatic ecosystems, creating 
benefits for biodiversity, the recreation industry, the fishing 
industry, and for agriculture itself where pollution affects sources 
of irrigation water.26  Agricultural nonpoint source pollution 
generates numerous environmental and human health costs. The 
SDWA mitigates only one of those costs. 
Finally, as the title of this essay suggests, the interaction 
between the two statutes must be understood in the broader 
context of the food system.  Water is food too. I mean this in the 
literal sense: the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act defines food as 
“articles used for food or drink for man or other animals.”27  But, 
water is often excluded from discussions about the importance of 
protecting our food system. The agriculture industry has been 
very successful at curbing federal environmental regulation.28  
Among the industry’s wide-ranging rhetoric is the argument that 
meager regulation generates the benefit of cheap food, which we 
all enjoy. But letting farmers off the hook in the name of cheap 
 
 25. Even New York City would likely not be able to achieve the level of source 
control it now enjoys had it not taken significant steps to obtain that control 
over a century ago. In the late nineteenth century, the City annexed lands and 
protected large swaths of land for watershed protection at a time when there 
was widespread support for this kind of aggressive step to protect the City’s 
economic competitiveness and with little resistance from the surrounding 
territories. See generally MATTHEW GANDY, CONCRETE AND CLAY: REWORKING 
NATURE IN NEW YORK CITY 18-23 (2003) (retelling the history of New York City’s 
water infrastructure and the political context’s that made its development 
possible). Given changed political circumstances this model would be difficult, if 
not impossible, to replicate today. 
 26. See MARC O. RIBAUDO ET AL., ECONOMICS OF WATER QUALITY PROTECTION 
FROM NONPOINT SOURCES: THEORY AND PRACTICE 23-25 (1999), available at 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/1385896/aer782.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
79YA-87W7. 
 27. 21 U.S.C. § 321(f)(1). While the EPA regulates tap water through the 
SDWA, the Food and Drug Administration regulates bottle water as a food 
pursuant to the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). 
 28. See MEGAN STUBBS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41622, ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION AND AGRICULTURE 15 (2014), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc 
/R41622.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/L539-5Q6X. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss2/8
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food is less justifiable, if it was ever justifiable, if the spillover 
cost is expensive water.29 
Even worse, the interplay between the Clean Water Act and 
the SDWA pits cities against agricultural areas, and residential 
communities against farmers. Although some urban water 
utilities and environmental protection agencies have or could 
enter into cooperative relationships with their rural hinterlands, 
others will take a more antagonistic path.30  This antagonism 
perpetuates the perception of an urban/rural dichotomy and 
obscures the mutually dependent relationship between the two 
that is the basis of a healthy food system.31 
To return to the theme of this symposium, reconceptualizing 
the future of environmental law, the dynamic between the SDWA 
and the Clean Water Act highlights the need for a systems 
approach to thinking about environmental regulation of the food 
system.32  Water is an environmental system in physical space. It 
feeds farms (as irrigation water), it collects their pollution (from 
irrigation and stormwater runoff), and it feeds municipalities (as 
drinking water). This system crosses political jurisdictions. A 
regulatory system that creates antagonism across jurisdictions 
makes this physical system more difficult to manage.33 
 
 29. Another way to think about this is that water contamination is itself a 
food safety issue. Water safety law thus suffers from a similar critical flaw with 
the recent food safety modernization. Neither statute adequately addresses 
sources of cross contamination. Just as the SDWA provides no mechanism to 
address nonpoint source pollution, the Food Safety Modernization Act provides 
inadequate mechanisms to protect leafy greens and other fresh produce from 
contaminated runoff from concentrated animal feeding operations. 42 U.S.C. § 
300f-g; FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 
(codified as amended throughout title 21 of the U.S. Code). 
30. See supra text accompanying note 16. 
 31. WILLIAM CRONON, NATURE’S METROPOLIS: CHICAGO AND THE GREAT WEST, 
at xiv-xv (1992). 
 32. See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental 
Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795 (2005) (calling for “a high degree of flexible 
coordination across government agencies as well as between public agencies and 
private actors” to allow for creative and bigger picture problem solving). 
 33. Many scholars have recognized the mismatch between environmental 
systems and political systems and have considered how political systems should 
approach environmental regulation in light of both this fact and the fact that 
environmental systems themselves are extraordinarily complex. See, e.g., J.B. 
Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to 
9
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Access to safe drinking water is nearly ubiquitous in this 
country. Efficient (as in cost minimizing) preservation of this 
resource requires reconciliation of the various statutory schemes 
that govern the resource and the various political jurisdictions 
that manage it. Food Law, as an outgrowth of environmental law, 
among other things, provides a useful lens through which to 
approach this reconciliation. As an emerging discipline, Food Law 
invites a fresh examination of water as a complex element of the 
food system, drawing together what otherwise might be disparate 
environmental law questions related to equitable access to safe 
drinking water, preservation of aquatic ecosystems, and 
transitions to sustainable agriculture. 
 
 
Clean up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. 
REV. 933, 981 (1997). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss2/8
